Northern Iraq:  One Year Later. by Cuny, Frederick C.
CARNEGIE SPECIAL REPORT
s ' - ' ' "
NORTHERN IRAQ: ONE YEAR LATER
by
Frederick C. Cuny*
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International Peace. He spent five months in northern Iraq in 1991 helping plan and 
implement the return of the more than 400,000 Kurds who had fled to Turkey in the 
aftermath of the failed Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein. The Endowment asked 
him to return to northern Iraq- to make a first-hand assessment of what has happened in 
the area in the intervening year and the prospects for the Kurds.
This is his report of a complex and changing situation. The future of the Iraqi 
Kurds is very uncertain. The findings and recommendations, of course, represent Mr.
Cuny’s views only. The Carnegie Endowment only emphasizes the importance of the 
issuer ■ " '
— Morton Abramowitz 
President, Carnegie Endowment
INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
On July 15, 1991, the last of the allied combat soldiers sent to northern Iraq to help 
establish a safe haven for Kurdish refugees left the security zone, bringing an end to one 
of the most remarkable humanitarian operations in history. In less than three months, a 
combined military and civilian task force known as Operation Provide Comfort had 
effectively stopped the persecution of Kurds by the Iraqi government, returned 400,000 
refugees to northern Iraq, helped restart the economy, and put the Kurds in a better 
position to negotiate their future status with the Iraqi government.
With the withdrawal of combat troops, the allies had hoped that the overall problem 
would soon be resolved and that the United States and its allies could disengage militarily 
from the region. That did not happen. The allies continue to extend military protection
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and maintain a small team in the area to convey a sense of a commitment to the Kurds until 
they are in a better position to normalize their situation within Iraq. That situation remains 
highly charged and has become more complex due to other factors such as the increased 
intensity of an insurgency in the Kurdish areas of Turkey led by the Kurdish Workers Party 
(PKK). Saddam Hussein remains the prevalent threat to the Iraqi Kurds and his army has 
recently increased its presence in the areas bordering on the Kurdish enclave.
. In midst of this situation, the United States and its allies are faced with several 
dilemmas, including:
How to protect the Iraqi Kurds without being drawn into a conflict with Iraq;
How to support the Kurds without alienating Turkey, a major U.S. ally;
How to protect the Kurds without encouraging them to think that the Allies 
will support their independence; and
How to bring pressure on the government of Saddam Hussein without hurting 
the Kurds (and other anti-government elements.)
This report examines the evolution of the current situation in northern Iraq, analyses 
the dilemmas that face U.S. and allied policymakers, explores potential problems and makes 
some suggestions for addressing them.
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
1. The situation is stalemated. The parties are playing for time. The allies, Iraqis, 
Turks, and the Kurds’ other neighbors are all caught in a situation from which they 
can neither disengage nor resolve.
2. The Kurds are trying to take advantage of the others’ gridlock by solidifying their 
political, economic and military situation and moving slowly and stealthily toward 
something that is more than autonomy within Iraq. Their recent elections have 
unified the country and increased their standing in Europe, but that will have little 
impact on the outcome of their situation.
3. Despite Kurdish aspirations for self determination, they are still tied closely by 
geography, economics, and demography to Iraq. Over a quarter of the Iraqi Kurdish 
population lives outside Kurdistan and has shown no sign of moving to the north.
4. The independent moves by the Iraqi Kurds have alarmed the Turks who are involved 
in an escalating conflict with the Kurds in their own country. The Turkish military 
believes that the two groups have more than casual contacts and has tried to drive 
a wedge between the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK by bombing Kurdistan.
5. The Iraqis may have been receiving the wrong signals regarding allied resolve to 
protect the Kurds during this period due to the workings of the allied policymaking 
system. However, the imposition of the recent "no fly zone" over southern Iraq 
should make it clear that the allies will use military force to protect minorities within 
the country, at least for the near future.
5. A major new refugee crisis is unlikely as long as the allies maintain the restrictions 
on the Iraqi air force.
7. During the year, the Iraqis continuously probed and tested allied resolve and will 
continue to do so. The no fly zone in the south was also an effective 
countermeasure to recent Iraqi military moves in the north and should deter direct 
military action against the Kurds. Nonetheless, Saddam Hussein may try to create 
an incident to embarrass the Bush administration before the election, though his 
options are now very limited.
5. The most worrisome immediate problem is the potential for increased terrorism 
against foreigners working in Kurdistan and the effect that could have on the 
humanitarian presence that is part of the protective arrangements for the Kurds.
Despite a blockade by the Iraqis and recently by the PKK, as well as the adverse 
affects of the UN sanctions, Kurdistan is surviving economically. They are profiting 
from taxing blockade runners from Turkey, and even the Iraqis are forced to deal 








II. EVENTS OF THE LAST YEAR
THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1991
As the allies left the security zone, there was some cause for optimism. Repatriation 
of the refugees that had fled to the mountains along the Turkish border was complete. 
Only a small population of Kurds who considered it too risky to return to Iraq under any 
circumstances remained in a few small camps inside Turkey. In the area east of the allied 
security zone, many refugees who had fled to Iran were also returning.
Kurdish families were returning with the intent of rebuilding the villages destroyed 
by the Iraqi government between 1972 and 1990 and reclaiming their land. They wanted 
to reestablish a Kurdish presence in the rural areas. The only Kurdish city not being 
repopulated was Kirkuk, which the Iraqis held. Even though the allied security zone had 
not extended further than Suriya, a small town 100 km east of the Turkish border, the mere 
threat that the allies might extend the security zone further east had caused the Iraqis to 
halt their attacks in the area and withdraw to positions south of Irbil and Sulaymaniya. This 
left the Kurdish resistance, the peshmerge, in charge of most of what is traditionally 
considered Iraqi Kurdistan.
During the Kurdish uprising fighting had been limited to Kirkuk and the border areas 
of Kurdistan. In the allied security zone most of the destruction was to military or police 
facilities and, with the exception of some reprisal dynamiting, housing had been undamaged. 
Thus, when people returned from the mountains to their cities, many were able to go 
directly to their homes and quickly resume their normal life.
Before the allies left they helped harvest the abundant grain growing in the area and 
negotiate a deal between the Kurds and the Iraqi government to market the grain. The 
injection of capital that the grain sales provided helped to re-energize the economy and 
when the allies departed, shops, stores and virtually all economic activities were operating 
close to normal. Most importantly, trade had resumed with the south, the Kurds marketing 
grain and bringing basic provisions and fuel back to the north. Even municipal services, 
such as water, power and sanitary services, had been restored by the time of the allied 
departure.
POST-WITHDRAWAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
To protect the Kurds against an Iraqi return, a dual military and humanitarian 
presence was left in place for what the allies hoped would be a short, interim period. To 
provide military protection the allies had delivered a demarche to the Iraqis warning them 
to stay out of the area and implying that military force would be used if the Iraqis tried to 
re-enter the zone by force.1
1 The demarche specified the security zone, but the Iraqis took it to apply to all of Kurdistan.
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The demarche was backed up by three elements: First, the allies established a small, 
but potent rapid reaction force just across the Turkish border in Silopi. It was an 
international force with an integral assault helicopter company supported by fighters from 
Incirlik air base also in Turkey.
Second, the allies continued to fly armed reconnaissance missions over Kurdistan. 
The Iraqis were instructed not to interfere with the flights nor to operate any aircraft or 
anti-aircraft systems north of the 38th parallel.
Finally, the Military Coordination Center (MCC), a small militaiy team that had 
been set up to handle day-to-day negotiations with the Iraqis, was left behind in Silopi with 
forward offices in Zakho. After the allied departure, the MCC was to monitor and report 
on military developments in the area and to coordinate with the humanitarian assistance 
agencies. In practice, the MCC also helped to facilitate the work of the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations inside the security zone. One of its most 
important functions was to reassure the civilian relief agencies that the military was still 
looking out for their interests -  most NGOs felt that as long as the MCC was in the area, 
it was safe to continue to work.
The humanitarian presence consisted of an international effort to provide relief and 
reconstruction assistance. The UN was represented by staff from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was responsible for helping refugees 
reintegrate into their communities; the United Nations Guard Contingent in Iraq (GCI), 
a token force of security guards whose principal mission was to protect UN facilities and 
escort humanitarian convoys; and the World Food Programme (WFP), which provided food 
support throughout the winter.
The small number of agencies that had helped during the repatriation effort quickly 
doubled in number and size and deployed throughout Kurdistan. Over two dozen NGOs 
helped rebuild villages and deliver vital relief supplies. These agencies were largely 
European though CARE, International Rescue Committee, and several other American 
organizations continued to work in the area. Together, the UN and NGOs provided 
important assistance and helped serve as a symbolic deterrent to Iraqi incursions in the 
area.
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KURDS AND IRAQ
At the time the allies withdrew, the Kurds and the Iraqi government appeared close 
to signing an agreement that would supposedly give the Kurds autonomy in the north and 
would solve many of the issues that lead to the uprising. The leaders of the two principal 
Kurdish resistance groups, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and 
Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), had been meeting with Saddam 
Hussein and an agreement appeared to be within reach. Even though the allies insisted that 
they would not link their withdrawal to conclusion of the agreement (in part because they 
doubted the Iraqis would honor an agreement signed under the threat of a continued allied 
presence), many were optimistic that the Kurdish leaders, especially Barzani, would sign the
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agreement. (Barzani said that he viewed it as a matter of Kurdish cultural and ethnic 
survival in Iraq.) While the agreement was not ideal, it was considered the best that could 
be negotiated under the circumstances.
Contrary to allied expectations, negotiations between the Kurds and the Iraqi 
government broke off within months after the allied withdrawal. The Kurds blamed Saddam 
Hussein for imposing last minute changes that effectively denied them autonomy and 
precluded the formation of a democratic state. Privately, they also blame the allies, 
claiming that Saddam Hussein changed the terms after it became clear that the allies were 
leaving. He progressively became less conciliatory and open to negotiation as the rapid 
reaction force was withdrawn.
When the Kurds refused to return to the bargaining table, the Iraqis imposed an 
economic blockade on the north which reduced fuel supplies to a minimum and prevented 
shipments of other supplies from being transported commercially to the north. They 
imposed restrictions on what the UN could take into the area but continued to allow UN 
convoys to bring relief supplies. Subsequently, the government also stopped paying salaries 
for Kurdish workers in the north.
CHANGES IN SECURITY AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE YEAR
On the military front, the Iraqis have increased pressures on the Kurds in the eastern 
part of Kurdistan. They continue to bombard Kurdish positions along the line of 
demarcation between the Kurds and the Iraqi army with artillery fire. In recent months 
they have increased the size of their forces opposite Irbil and Sulaymaniya.
During the year there were a number of changes in the security arrangements that 
have a bearing on the current situation. On the military side, the rapid reaction force in 
Turkey was disbanded six months after the main force withdrew from northern Iraq. To 
offset withdrawal of the ground force, air support was increased. Most importantly, 
elements of the RAF and French Air Force joined the U.S. Air Force and Navy in 
patrolling Kurdistan. While the increased number of aircraft was not significant, the fact 
that it became a multinational force was meant to show allied solidarity in defending the 
Kurds.
Inside northern Iraq the MCC became a major factor in the security arrangements. 
Within weeks of the allies’ departure, the MCC established a full-time presence in Zakho, 
a city on the northwest border of Iraq and Turkey which had been the headquarters of the 
allied forces during Operation Provide Comfort. The MCC was also expanded to include 
other allied representatives. While some of those departed with their national units, the 
British and French still make up two-thirds of the MCC, demonstrating that Britain and 
France are still committed to protecting the Kurds.
On the civilian side, there also have been a number of changes. In the spring of 
1992, UNICEF took over as lead agency from UNHCR. The transition to UNICEF 
administration has not been without controversy. Many observers believe that it was
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handled too quickly and that UNICEF does not have sufficient staff to take over all of 
UNHCR’s functions.
The UN Guard Contingent in Iraq (GCI) expanded their presence significantly 
during the year but never fully established the credible presence for which allied 
policymakers had hoped. While they constitute a visible portion of the overall UN 
presence, most NGOs, and, more importantly, the Kurds, understand that they could be 
quickly expelled by the Iraqis.
The entire UN presence, and that of some of the NGOs working under the UN 
umbrella, is subject to Iraqi concurrence under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
concluded by the UN with Baghdad. The original MOU was for one year and expired at 
the end of June. While many Western observers believe that the MOU will be extended 
if Turkey agrees to extend its agreement permitting allied planes to use Turkish bases, there 
has been no word from the Iraqis. In response to allied pressure, the UN has announced 
that it will stay in northern Iraq.
The NGO presence during the last year has expanded and become, in an operational 
sense, more important than that of the UN. The majority of reconstruction assistance and 
help in restoring the economy has come largely from the NGOs. While many NGOs have 
chosen to work under the UN umbrella, there are a significant number who remain 
unregistered and operate primarily out of Turkey. In addition, two Kurdish relief 
organizations, heavily supported by European donors and personnel, have emerged.
The NGOs believe that their presence is vital to the security arrangements and feel 
that without their assistance, social and physical conditions in the area could deteriorate.
The NGOs working under the UN umbrella were plagued by bureaucratic obstacles 
imposed by Baghdad throughout the year. H ie Iraqis have not renewed many visas nor 
issued new ones and those personnel with visas have often found it difficult to obtain travel 
permits. Many NGOs working under the MOU have significantly reduced their staff 
because the prerequisite paperwork cannot be obtained. Others are worried that the MOU 
will not be extended and are uneasy about working without legal status in Iraq even if the 
UN remains. On the other hand, many of the most important agencies are prepared to 
continue whether or not the MOU is extended. They say they will remain as long as the 
MCC stays and overflights continue. If the NGOs depart, that would leave only the UN 
and it would be subject to Iraqi expulsion on short notice.
The most recent development has been the imposition of a "no fly zone" over 
southern Iraq designed to help protect the Shiia in that area. It is unclear how the 
restrictions on the use of planes will affect the situation in the north but it will surely make 
the Iraqi army more cautious on the ground.
8
The blockade was not as effective as the Iraqis initially expected. First, the Iraqis 
can close only one border of Kurdistan; they cannot control the Turkish or Iranian borders 
from where a substantial flow of goods has been entering the area. Most importantly, the 
Iraqis cannot tighten their own blockade too much because the Kurds could retaliate by 
stopping the flow of goods from Turkey. Through July an unwritten agreement seemed to 
exist between the Kurds and Iraq that permitted a two-way flow of goods through Kurdistan. 
Turkish trucks were taxed by the Kurds as they passed through Kurdistan to Mosul and 
Baghdad. After dropping their cargos in Iraq the trucks loaded up with excess fuel, which 
was carried in massive tanks attached to the underside of the trucks, and proceeded north 
where they were again taxed as they transited Kurdistan. (Back in Turkey they sold the fuel 
on the Turkish market.) As many as 3,500 trucks per day passed through Kurdistan each 
way in July. In late July, this changed. The PKK, presumably at the request of the Iraqis, 
imposed a 30-day ban on trucks going to Iraq and threatened to attack any truck passing 
through the Kurdish zone in southeastern Turkey. This brought the flow of supplies to Iraq, 
and the tax revenue to the Kurds, to a halt. At the end of the 30-day period, the truckers 
resumed trade with Iraq. (Eight hundred trucks crossed into northern Iraq the first day the 
PKK ban ended.)
The activity most effected by the blockade is reconstruction. Prior to the blockade 
some cement and other building materials were moving northward. Since the blockade all 
materials have come from Turkey, and the Turks have largely stemmed the flow of cement, 
rubber, roof sheets and other essential reconstruction items from crossing the border at 
Silopi, the main crossing for traffic bound for Iraq from Turkey.
There is no question that food costs more than a year ago, but it is important to 
remember that at that time, basic food and other essential goods were heavily subsidized 
by the Iraqi government. Even though prices for commodities such as milk and bread are 
three times what they were a year ago, they are still substantially lower than in Turkey and 
are now more in line with market prices.
The Iraqis are not in a good position to cut power supplies to the area. If the 
generating station were to be closed down, Baghdad would loose its power too. The plant 
is close enough to the Kurdish positions that the Iraqis do not want to risk tampering with 
the power lines going into Kurdistan for fear of retaliation.
TH E IMPACT OF THE IRAQI BLOCKADE
As mentioned earlier, civil servants, municipal utility personnel, school teachers, bus 
drivers, etc. no longer receive an income. But since the government only employed 
approximately 7 percent of the population in Kurdistan, this has had only a limited impact 
on the economy.
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III. THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT
THE SECURITY SITUATION
In recent months the Iraqis increased their military presence in the north. Two 
Republican Guard Divisions were moved closer to Irbil and Sulaymaniya. Some allied 
officers close to the situation believe that the Iraqis are positioning themselves to be able 
to cut the cities off from the mountain areas. The deployment of the Iraqi forces seemed 
to indicate that if they were to initiate military action, it would be in areas east of the allied 
security zone. They may have come to believe that they had a freer hand militarily in east 
Kurdistan than in the west.
The creation of the no fly zone in the south has substantially improved the security 
situation for the Kurds. Prior to this, allied commanders were worried that the Iraqis might 
try to seal off the city of Irbil, cut off Sulaymaniya from the mountains, or take other 
military moves in the southeastern part of Kurdistan. (Irbil could easily be taken by simply 
closing the road between the city and the mountains. Capturing Sulaymaniya would be 
more costly, but given the disposition of troops and the weakness of the peshmerge, it could 
be accomplished without much difficulty.)
The no fly zone makes such moves unlikely. Essentially the Iraqi military is limited 
to a very narrow operational area with allied air forces operating to their front and rear. 
Furthermore, the Iraqis must now consider that if they were to make a move against the 
Kurds in the north, the targets that the allies might chose to bomb would not necessarily 
be limited to that area.
While the potential for a conventional military confrontation has been significantly 
diminished, the Iraqis are now more likely to expand their support for terrorist attacks on 
the Kurds and their supporters.
TERRORISM IN KURDISTAN
On of the most remarkable aspects of the situation during the last year was the lack 
of terrorist incidents within Kurdistan. However, in July an ominous pattern emerged: 
terrorist attacks on prominent international visitors and humanitarian agency staff. A car 
bomb was set off at a hotel in Dahouk where international journalists and election monitors 
were staying during the Kurdish elections; a similar bomb was set off as a motorcade 
carrying the wife of the French President, Mrs. Francois Mitterrand, passed by; and in mid- 
July, a UN guard was assassinated and a car bomb set off in front of a UN guard office. 
In August an NGO worker and his driver were assassinated. All of these incidents are 
believed to be the work of Iraqi agents, possibly working through the PKK, and seem to be 
designed to intimidate the humanitarian agencies into leaving the area and to convince the 
Kurds international supporters that the Kurds cannot provide security in the area. How 
successful this tactic will be is not yet clear, but if UN and NGO personnel are repeatedly 
attacked, there is no doubt that their headquarters will drastically reduce their staffs. This
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could effectively reduce one component of the international presence and weaken the entire 
post withdrawal security arrangements.
The Allies need to review the implications of increased violence inside Kurdistan and 
especially the former security zone and develop an appropriate preventive response.
THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOTHER REFUGEE CRISIS
At the present time any offensive against the Kurds which would drive refugees back 
into Turkey is unlikely. At the end of June, the Turks agreed to extend the agreement 
(called Operation Provide Comfort II, or OPC II) that gives their permission for the allies 
to use Turkish bases to protect the Kurds. The extension, however, was only for six months. 
For the next four months, i.e., the time remaining under the present agreement, the Iraqis 
are hemmed in on both sides. There was some concern that the Turks might not extend 
the agreement in January; however, they are not likely to abrogate the use of the bases as 
long as the southern no fly zone is in force.
PRECONDITIONS FOR ALLIED INTERVENTION
If something other than a minor incident that could be handled within the framework 
of the existing protective structure and agreements were to occur, there would be two 
principal prerequisites for mounting a major allied response: allied support and Turkish 
goodwill.
The principal U.S. allies, France and Great Britain, would likely approve a military 
response quickly and if they joined, other countries would participate as well, though most 
in a support, rather than combat, role.
The most important factor will be Turkey’s goodwill. Unfortunately, this is 
something that will be difficult to orchestrate after the fact -  the foundations must be laid 
now. The factors that will determine Turkey’s goodwill include:
1. How it views the development of the autonomous Kurdish state;
2. What advantage the Turks see in their political situation, is a is Europe and 
NATO; and
3. How Turkey sees the situation in relation to their own internal Kurdish problem.
From a tactical perspective, missions could be flown from Kuwait or from carriers 
operating in the Persian Gulf, though both the planes and the ships would be vulnerable. 
The fighters would have to fly over long stretches of Iraq and in case of an accident, 
American pilots might have to eject into Iraq. Thus, while it could be done, the operation
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would be more hazardous. The benefit of the Turkish bases is that the allied planes are 
almost always flying over friendly territory.2
Without Turkish participation, the MCC -  the ground element of the protective 
structure -- would not be practical. It is doubtful that the military would agree to leave a 
team in an area where their only access required crossing Iraq. (Several observers have 
posited that Syria should not be rejected out of hand as a possible alternative base for the 
MCC, though U.S. policymakers would probably be reluctant to explore that possibility.)
EXTENSION OF THE MOU
An immediate allied concern is Iraq’s extension of the Memorandum of 
Understanding that permits the UN and the NGOs to work in Iraq. The Iraqis have given 
every indication that they do not intend to extend it. In August, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, 
UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, went to Baghdad in an unsuccessful 
attempt to convince the Iraqi’s to change their minds. Last year the Iraqis were virtually 
forced to sign the MOU as a condition for humanitarian aid in the south, especially food 
aid. But this year reports indicate that the food situation is much better, and the Iraqis 
appear willing to forgo any further humanitarian assistance from the international 
community. Food and medical supplies are not embargoed and Iraq appears to have cash 
reserves to purchase what it needs, at least for the immediate future. Recent statements 
by World Food Programme that there are sufficient food reserves in the country and 
internal UN reports that the overall population of Iraq has returned to near normal 
nutritional standards, has led to speculation that food aid to will be reduced or ended soon.
If the MOU is not extended, it does not necessarily mean an end to the private 
humanitarian presence in the north. A number of NGOs have indicated that they are 
willing to stay on as long as the MCC remains and overflights continue. In fact almost half 
the agencies working in the north are not registered with Baghdad and many of the 
personnel within registered agencies are working in the north without documentation 
(mainly because they have been unable to get visas from the Iraqis).
The lapse of the MOU would not necessarily mean that all UN personnel would have 
to withdraw from the north. The allied position is that the UN is in Iraq under Resolution 
688 and does not need Iraqi authorization to stay. The UN itself is uneasy with that 
position but has said that it will remain during the "extended negotiations" for renewal. 
UNICEF could continue to operate there since it was operating in the country before the 
MOU was signed. Technically, UNDP could also work in the north, though it is unlikely 
to do so under the present circumstances (largely because most of the agency’s money is 
jointly administered by the UNDP and the government and it is unlikely that the Iraq would 
permit the money to be spent).
" In May a French Mirage suffered an engine failure and the pilot was forced to eject into Kurdistan. The 
pilot and the wreckage of the plane were successfully recovered.
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It is clear, however, that the UN presence would be substantially reduced. The UN 
guards might not be able to operate without the MOU and the small residual UNHCR staff 
and probably that of the World Food Programme would have to leave. Most of the UN 
projects would be halted (unless they were part of UNICEF’s country-wide program).
The biggest impact would be that the NGOs and the UN would find it more difficult 
to import materials for their programs. Even under the present MOU many agencies 
experience long delays and, in some cases, disapproval for cargos destined for the north. 
The small amount of supplies that comes in from Turkey under UN auspices could be 
stopped altogether because the Turks only allow humanitarian supplies transported by the 
UN or the U.S. government to cross the border -  generally NGOs cannot move their 
supplies independently. Thus, the allies would be faced with either having to modify the 
sanctions or pressure Turkey into allowing goods to cross the border without restriction.
The best response for the U.S. and the allies is the same as that in the military 
situation: to take preventative action to ensure that the MOU is extended in full. A much 
greater diplomatic effort should be mounted immediately to extend the MOU beyond the 
immediate deadline and to de-link its extension to the allied presence.
The uncertainty about the MOU comes at a bad time. Many NGOs are 
reconsidering the need for their work in northern Iraq compared to commitments in other 
areas and a shortage of funds. If the MOU lapsed, it could be a deciding factor in 
determining whether or not the agencies were to withdraw from the north.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF A DE FACTO AUTONOMOUS KURDISTAN
Ironically, the blockade has led many Kurds to believe that autonomy, and quite 
possibly independence, is feasible. Because of the blockade, they have had to produce many 
essential goods themselves or find ways to import them from their neighbors. The blockade 
is forcing a restructuring of the economic system in the area and making it more 
independent of the Iraqi economy than ever before. At the same time, political events -  
coupled with the allied security arrangements and the internal economic realignm ent- have 
combined in such a way that a de facto Kurdish autonomous region has evolved. In May, 
the Kurds made a bid to legitimize their status by conducting what many observers have 
noted, are the first free elections in the history of Iraq. In an astounding election where 88 
percent of the 1.1 million eligible voters, including all men and women over eighteen, cast 
ballots, 105 delegates were chosen to a constituent assembly seated in the building that the 
Iraqi government built in the 1970s to house the parliament of an autonomous Kurdistan. 
The elections were surprisingly close; Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) took 45 
percent of the vote while Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) captured 43.6 
percent. In a remarkable compromise, the two parties chose to give the remaining parties, 
which together won about 10.5 percent of the vote, five seats so that their voices could be 
heard officially.3
3 The remainder of the votes were for independent candidates.
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To allay fears that they were moving to create an independent Kurdistan, the Kurds 
surrounded the opening of the parliament with all the trappings and symbolism of the Iraqi 
government. Kurds dressed in Iraqi police uniforms patrolled the grounds and manned the 
main gate. The Iraqi flag was flown from the flagpole and adorned the speakers’ dias. In 
setting up formal committees, the parliament has been careful to limit the official scope of 
the activities to those that would be carried out by an autonomous region. For example, 
they have no foreign relations committee nor a committee to develop natural resources 
(those functions are, in fact, carried out in other ways). The Kurdish Front, which 
represents the major political parties and several of the smaller ones, held the elections to 
legitimize their claim to represent the views of the majority of Kurds and to provide a 
framework under which the leaders could bring together the diverse elements of the 
peshmerge into a single defensive force. Each of the principal party leaders also believes 
that the elections will make it easier for the Kurds to deal with Iraq and its neighbors. The 
parliament can now speak for the whole community.
There is no question that the elections were a public relations coup for the Kurds. 
They were viewed favorably by the Europeans and in many quarters of the United States. 
The elections were not only free, but remarkably untainted by fraud and were commended 
by human rights and electoral monitors from Europe and the United States. But the 
elections have also served to harden the attitudes of the Kurds’ neighbors. Iraq was, of 
course, opposed to them and the Syrians and the Iranians cannot be pleased to see a 
democratic success in their back yard. But the neighbor of most concern at this point is 
Turkey, for without Turkish acquiescence Kurdistan cannot survive.
The Turkish government has viewed not only the elections, but the emergence of the 
de facto autonomous region with concern. The Turks are fearful that an independent 
Kurdistan would stimulate similar aspirations inside Turkey, especially in the southeast 
where perhaps 6-8 million Kurds reside. While the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds are not close, 
the Turks fear a similar Kurdish movement in the southeast would encourage the separation 
of the Kurdish areas of Turkey.
To allay the Turkish government’s concerns, the leaders of the major parties have 
met with President Ozal and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and many Turkish 
parliamentarians and senior army officers to assure them that the Kurds are seeking a 
solution within the framework of a united Iraq. They insist, however, that a precondition 
for resuming normal ties with Baghdad is the installation of a democratic regime.
The Turkish parliament was invited to come to northern Iraq to witness the elections 
and five members chose to do so (all five were Kurds from eastern Turkey).
The Turks remain concerned, and it is clear that the government would still prefer 
to see the area remain part of a unified Iraq.
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STATEHOOD BY STEALTH
The elections and the formation of the Kurdistan national assembly are the most 
tangible form of "statehood" that the Kurds could establish without declaring unilateral 
independence. Not only does it give Iraqi Kurdistan the appearance of an independent 
state, but it permits them to establish relations with donors at a de facto state level.
The elections and the seating of the Kurdistan national assembly are expressions of 
statehood, no matter what the nature of the Kurdish entity or its relations with Baghdad 
are. For all intents and purposes, the Kurds are moving toward an independent entity in 
northern Iraq, i.e., achieving statehood by stealth. For the time being, cosmetics are the 
only chance they have of placating their neighbors and buying time to sell the idea to 
Turkey.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN KURDISTAN
A visitor entering northern Iraq for the first time would be surprised at its vibrancy. 
Markets are bustling and there appears to be no shortage of trade goods. Buses scurry 
about the main cities delivering people to work; taxis and private cars move as if oblivious 
to the fuel embargo. The agricultural fields were planted with a greater diversity than 
before. The Kurds have begun to grow vegetables in an attempt to diversify the agricultural 
system and replace commodities not obtainable from Iraq. Agricultural experts predict 
another bumper crop of grain despite insect infestation and weeds. The number of goats 
and sheep is sufficient to supply enough meat, though herds are smaller this year than usual. 
The situation is such that the UN is considering phasing out a large portion of the food aid 
program.
In the rural areas, the reconstruction of villages is continuing, but has been slowed 
due to the lack of building materials. When people were unable to obtain sufficient supplies 
to rebuild their shelters, the repatriation from Iran slowed considerably and halted 
altogether during the winter. In recent months there has been an increase in the number 
of people returning but most are moving to the cities where overcrowding is a problem.
REINTEGRATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
The reintegration of returned Kurds has been a much bigger problem in the areas 
east of the allied security zone, i.e., for those Kurds returning from Iran. Repatriation 
continued from July until the late fall when the first snows fell and it became obvious that 
housing reconstruction was not going to meet the needs of all those who had returned. 
Faced with severe shortages of basic food stuffs and fuel and the prospect of a severe 
winter, thousands of Kurds descended into the towns in the lowlands. While many left in 
the spring to start rebuilding their houses in the mountains, new incoming refugees from 
Iran have taken their place and the cities remain overcrowded. Virtually every government 
installation is being used to house homeless returnees.
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Agencies working from Turkey have increasingly had difficulty moving supplies across 
the border, especially after UNHCR transferred responsibility to UNICEF. A major 
problem has been a Turkish double standard on the issue of UN sanctions. While the 
government permits thousands of truckers to break the blockade and carry all sorts of 
supplies to Iraq daily, NGOs seeking permits to take supplies to Kurdistan often find their 
transit permits denied on the grounds that the supplies are proscribed by the sanctions. In 
recent weeks the Turks have even extended the ban to items that are not on the sanction 
list, such as medicines and pharmaceutical supplies.
The United Nations waited until the beginning of July 1991 to begin planning to 
provide winter shelter for the 100,000 people who were estimated to remain homeless after 
the repatriation from Iran. UNHCR waited for several months to see if an agreement 
would be signed between the Kurds and the Iraqis before initiating the program. (They 
apparently believed that if an agreement was signed, the burden for managing the 
reconstruction program could be shifted to UNDP or other agencies with more resources 
and experience.) In effect, UNHCR did not begin until October. Materials began coming 
in during that month, but implementation of the construction program was poor.
The situation worsened as the year ended. More refugees returned from Iran than 
had been previously estimated and an additional 200,000 people had to be added as a result 
of shelling along the Iraqi demarcation line. By that time the program was overcome by 
weather and overwhelmed by the number of applicants for assistance. Most of the people 
who could not rebuild their shelters before winter came moved to the cities; most were 
sheltered by friends or relatives but many had to be housed in schools, public buildings, and 
idle industrial facilities. The UN and NGOs provided food and other assistance through 
the winter and spring.
KURDISH RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL POWERS
IRAQ
Relations between the Kurds and Baghdad are only on an informal basis. Barzani 
has kept a representative in the capital but insists that no talks are going on there. Since 
the elections in Kurdistan, it would be extremely difficult for either of the principal Kurdish 
leaders to reengage the Iraqis unilaterally and it does not seem that the Front will agree to 
resuming talks anytime soon.
The situation poses many difficulties for the Kurdish people. More than 1.2 million 
Kurds live outside Kurdistan, many in Baghdad. Despite the economic blockade, there is 
still substantial links between northern Iraq and the rest of the country — the Iraqi dinar is 
still the currency in Kurdistan, many families routinely travel between the two areas, and 
it is clear that the economy of the north is still tied to that of Iraq. So even though 
"official" contacts are not being made, unofficial contacts are frequent and more extensive 
than would appear.
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On the diplomatic front, the Iraqis are trying to cut Turkey away from the allies, as 
well as trying to convince the Turks that they should resume trade relations if not formally 
at least informally, i.e., break the sanctions. So far they seem to be making some progress: 
after every mission, there has been a noticeable increase in cross-border traffic between 
Turkey and Iraq.
The Iraqis also are trying to convince both Turkey and Iran that the Kurds are trying 
to establish an independent state in the area and that it would be detrimental to all three 
countries if that were to happen. Ultimately they would like to be given a free hand by 
‘their neighbors to reestablish their control over the area and hope that they can play on the 
fear that the Turks and Iranians have that Iraqi Kurdistan could fuel a pan-Kurdish 
movement that would create a new country made up of parts of all three countries (and 
possibly Syria).
TURKEY
Kurdistan’s leaders have been actively trying to improve their relations with Turkey. 
They have two immediate objectives: to win Turkey’s support to break the Iraqi blockade 
(and the UN sanctions) and to convince Turkey to stop bombing Kurdistan. Their longer 
and more important goal is to convince the Turks that the Kurds in northern Iraq do not 
pose a threat to Turkey.
In recent months, the Kurdish leaders have had extensive contact with all sectors of 
fh® Turkish leadership. Both Barzani and Talabani appear to have good access to the 
Turkish leadership and to key parliamentarians. More importantly, they also appear to be 
developing good ties with the Turkish business community, i.e., persons who are in a 
position to exert influence on the government. Most observers believe that Turkey prefers 
dealing with Barzani and the KDP rather than Talabani. This is because they view him as 
being more committed to a solution within an Iraqi framework, but also because they 
believe he is less unpredictable than Talabani. Moreover, many Turks are convinced that 
Talabani is toying with the PKK.
Some leaders within the Turkish government see the evolution of an independent 
Kurdistan as a positive factor in the region. They believe the Kurds could be a buffer, not 
only against Iraq, but also against fundamentalism from Iran. Others see the evolution of 
an independent Kurdish state as a means of relieving pressure for Kurdish independence 
within Turkey.
The real question, however, is not the acquiescence of the civilians, but that of the 
military. So far, the Turkish general staff has been unequivocal in rejecting the idea of an 
independent Kurdistan.
Turkish politics have been dominated by a consistent tension between civilian and 
military policies. The Turkish general staff has preeminence over the government in 
matters of security. These matters are rendered more complex by the different roles played 
by the three entities responsible for state security: the army, the gendarme and the military
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police. Policies toward the Kurds, both in Turkey and in Iraq, have been injected into the 
very center of this problem. How relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds develop 
depends on how the military and all its internal factions come to view the situation in 
Kurdistan vis-a-vis the PKK insurgency.
Impact of Events in Southeastern Turkey on the Situation in Northern Iraq
The deteriorating security situation in southeastern Turkey has heightened the Turks’ 
‘concerns about the relationship between the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan and the insurgency 
in Turkey. The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) appears to have grown in strength during 
the last 12 months. The Turkish military claims that the PKK is receiving support and 
sanctuary from Kurds in northern Iraq. Within days of the allied withdrawal, the Turkish 
air force began bombing "suspected guerrilla positions" inside Kurdistan and, on several 
occasions, the government has launched heliborne assaults across the border in an attempt 
to capture PKK guerrillas or to destroy their facilities. (These assaults have proved 
fruitless, most of the suspected PKK positions have been civilian villages.4)
Turkish bombings continue for five reasons:
1. The Turkish military are acting in some cases on bona fide intelligence reports;
2. The military believes that it will deter the PKK;
3. The government believes that bombing will drive a wedge between the PKK and the
Iraqi Kurds and force the Iraqi Kurds to help control the PKK to protect their 
movement;
4. The Turkish general staff may believe that it will undermine the growing links 
between the Government of Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds; and
5. It will convince the Turkish public that something is being done and that the problem 
is a result of external interference rather than problems inside the country.
The situation in southeastern Turkey and the bombings in Iraq have strained 
relations, not only between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turks but also between Turkey and the 
allies. On some days, U.S. fighter-bombers take off to fly armed reconnaissance over 
Kurdistan to discourage the Iraqis while Turkish fighters take off to attack Kurdish positions 
in the same vicinity. The bombings are a major embarrassment for the allies; the Turks are, 
after all, a member of the coalition to protect the Iraqi Kurds.
The Turks have told the Front to control the PKK if it wants to keep the border 
open. Barzani has promised to try to control the PKK and hispeshmerge have engaged the 
PKK in minor skirmishes. Talabani, however, has remained more aloof. He believes that
Sources. Military Coordinator Center, UNHCR, personal visits.
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the best way to control the PKK is to repopulate the areas along the border so that the 
PKK’s passage to and fro can be detected. The Turks have rejected this proposal for fear 
that it would put more civilians in the way and instead want the Kurds to clear a no-man’s 
land along the border (presumably so it could become a free-fire zone where anyone within 
it could be attacked). Clearly the Kurd’s response to the PKK has not satisfied the Turks 
(nor many American policy makers). In early June the Turkish government delivered a 
demarche to the Front demanding that all reconstruction of Kurdish villages along the 
border be halted and that the populations be evacuated.
* The Turkish military is concerned about the PKK’s sources of support. Some officers 
clearly believe that the Iraq Kurds are giving them weapons. At one point, the Turkish 
government even accused the United States of dropping supplies to the PKK. (That 
accusation stemmed from a supply drop to Kurds trapped in winter snows. A helicopter 
making the drop apparently became lost and inadvertently dropped its supplies in Turkey.) 
More important than this incident is the belief on the part of some Turkish officers that 
allied support for the Iraqi Kurds is undermining their campaign to suppress the PKK. 
They argue that an autonomous Kurdistan would support the PKK.
For its part, the U.S. and the allies have been careful not to interfere. The MCC has 
even been ordered not to investigate bombings of Kurdish villages. There have been some 
near misses and Turkish bombs fell on villages where NGOs and UN staff were working.
At this point, it is unclear exactly how many PKK use northern Iraq as a base 
(Barzani says that the PKK numbers less than 5,000, while Talabani sets the number at 
approximately 3,000). But the PKK is attacking Turkey from Iraq and with increasing 
frequency and boldness. Several allied observers believe that the Turks, frustrated by their 
inability to suppress the movement at home, find it convenient to bomb northern Iraq and 
blame "foreign intervention" for the uprising and their inability to control it. The fact that 
the Turks have limited their military action to bombing, which they surely must know is 
extremely ineffective against guerrillas, lends credence to this claim.
Whatever the actual numbers of PKK cadres that use northern Iraq, they are 
probably smaller than officially estimated. Journalists who have traveled with the PKK 
report that they stay away from the Iraqi Kurdish settlements and operate in small, 
independent units that can live off the land and the scarce resources currently there. None 
of the over 2,000 relief workers in the zone has reported encountering the PKK, nor 
reported instances where the PKK has attempted to acquire relief supplies.
RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES
The Kurds have devoted much effort to establishing good relations with all the allies. 
They have focused their efforts on the U.S., Great Britain and France. Recently, they have 
expanded their presence in Washington and have actively cultivated Congress. However, 
the principal official contacts are through the Military Coordination Center (MCC) in Iraq 
and the U.S. Embassy in Turkey. Despite U.S. misgivings about the situation, relations
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between the Kurds and the U.S. are good and the U.S. remains committed, for the time 
being, to protecting the Kurds.
The Kurds are on very good relations with the Europeans. They have worked hard 
to expand their contacts with the governments of John Major and Francois Mitterrand and 
have even gained strong support in Germany. However, there is no "European policy" on 
the Kurdish issue. The Europeans are preoccupied with the Maasterich agreement and 
Yugoslavia. At the moment, the principal concern of Europe is the Turkish treatment of 
its Kurds -  something that hurts the Iraqi Kurds in their dealings with Turkey. The French 
position is illustrative. As outlined in three points during President Mitterrand’s visit to 
Ankara in April, 1992, France condemned:
1. Any notion of Kurdish succession within any state;
2. Terrorism and the tactics of the PKK; and
3. Human rights abuses in eastern Turkey.
France, however, remains one of the Kurds strongest supporters in international fora 
(largely because the Institut Kurde and Madame Mitterrand’s commitment to the Kurds).
Britain also is strongly supportive of the Kurds, though, again, in the context of a 
solution within the framework of a united Iraq. John Major was instrumental in triggering 
western intervention in Iraq in 1991 and his personal prestige is on the line.
Germany seems the most committed to the Kurds, both in Iraq and in Turkey, but 
the extent of German support is limited by Germany’s lack of military clout on the 
international scene and by the resignation of Foreign Minister Genscher who was personally 
committed to supporting the Kurds. Italy is not a major player on the Kurdish question and 
at the moment is more concerned with developments in Yugoslavia.
Thus, while European support is important, it is only effective as a means of bringing 
pressure on the U.S. -  no European country can support the Kurds against Iraq alone. 
While several European air forces could continue to overfly Kurdistan if the U.S. were to 
withdraw, no EC country has the ability to back up the threat should the Iraqis decide to 
move on the Kurds. It is even doubtful that the Europeans have the clout necessary to 
convince the Turks to continue overflights in the absence of the U.S.
KURDISH EXPECTATIONS
For their part, the Kurds may be overestimating the U.S.’s long-term commitment. 
They interpret every U.S. move against Iraq as support for their position and constantly call 
on the U.S., especially the MCC, for help in resolving everyday issues. The imposition of 
the no fly zone in southern Iraq may also contribute to their false sense of security.
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In this environment where long-term support for the Kurds may not be as strong as 
it appears, many observers are worried that the Kurds are experiencing a "Prague spring." 
Hopes for democracy, self-determination and autonomy, interspersed with an unprecedented 
degree of personal freedom unseen in their lifetime, are infusing the Kurds with what may 
be an unrealistic view of their situation and their future. Surrounded as they are by hostile 
neighbors, they cannot exist without the support of the West, and that support is tenuous 
at best.
THE ROLE OF THE MCC
The MCC has evolved into a vital element of the protective framework in northern 
Iraq, both militarily and politically. Furthermore, it is the one place where the allies and 
the Iraqis interact on a regular basis to deal with the Kurdish issue. Throughout the last 
12 months, the MCC, as the forward element of the allied presence, was, in effect, often 
making policy. When heavy snows blocked food supplies to the Kurds, the MCC conducted 
airdrops to remote settlements using the helicopters assigned to the team. This moved the 
U S- into the role of providing emergency humanitarian assistance, what U.S. policymakers 
had hoped to limit to the UN and NGOs.
The reality is that the MCC must often make on-site decisions that will shape policy. 
Often the MCC is the first to know about major developments and must react quickly 
During the last year some policymakers felt that the MCC was acting too independently and 
formulating, rather than carrying out, allied policy. With the recent change in command at 
the MCC, a more limited role was crafted by Washington and the policy guidance was made 
more restrictive. In some cases, the intent of the instructions given by the U.S. to the 
commanding officer of the MCC is different from the instructions given to the British and 
French members of the team; this led to some concern on their part about American
intentions. The no fly zone and recent military exercises in Kuwait should have reduced this 
concern.
However, it is important to be aware of some of the structural problems that exist 
in the MCC’s working arrangements in the future. As the main daily interface between the 
U.S. government and the Kurds and between the allied forces and the Iraqi military, it is 
important to consider the messages" that those contacts might be sending to each. For 
example, when the allies are slow to respond to a situation that has obviously come to the 
attention of the MCC, the Iraqis may interpret it as a lessening of allied commitment. The 
MCC must be able to act quickly on various matters or the Iraqis may misconstrue a slow 
response as indecision or a lack of resolve.
This could be handled in two ways: first, provide a broader framework of guidance 
to the MCC and devolve a greater degree of decision-making on minor issues and; second, 
review possible Iraqi provocations under the present circumstances and state or restate what 
should be the allied policy and its most likely responses.
Another problem may be arising out of the routine work of the MCC. Every time 
an incident occurs, the MCC goes to the Iraqi military base at Faida (a small town that sits
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on the line of demarkation south of Dahouk) to discuss it with the Iraqis. During the 
period of this study, some of the issues discussed were harassment of truck drivers passing 
from the Iraqi zone into Kurdistan; the detention and subsequent disappearance of several 
Kurdish teenagers who were taken at a checkpoint as they attempted to go north; a number 
of incidents resulting from the Iraqi blockade, including the practice of siphoning gasoline 
out of Kurdish vehicles as they go north; and an incident where several Iraqi soldiers had 
slipped across the fence near Faida into the restricted area (though apparently without 
hostile intent). The point is that the MCC is delving into the minutia of the situation and 
registering concern about issues that, in many cases, the allies can do nothing about. The 
USAF is certainly not going to bomb Iraqi positions over a kidnapping, the siphoning of fuel 
from Kurdish vehicles, or any of the other minor incidents. From these activities however, 
the Kurds may be led to believe that the U.S. has a greater interest than it does in Kurdish 
affairs.
The original role of the MCC was to monitor and report on military concerns, not 
to intervene with the Iraqis on day-to-day issues. While it would be legitimate for the MCC 
to address the Iraqis on the issue of the blockade in general, dealing with minor incidents 
related to the blockade would not. The dilemma, however, is how to bring the MCC back 
into its original monitoring role without intimating that the U.S. is losing concern about 
other aspects of the mission.
Another area of concern is the declining role of the MCC in the humanitarian 
assistance effort. Last year, the MCC administered a humanitarian aid budget of $5 million 
for food, shelter and medicine. The MCC also was active in helping the agencies move 
supplies into Kurdistan from Turkey. That role, however, seems to be at an end. NGOs 
have complained that the MCC is no longer able to help them move supplies, intervene on 
their behalf with the Iraqis to obtain visas or other permits, nor provide them with other 
types of assistance that used to be available before the change of command. Giving the 
MCC authority to deal with the Turkish border authorities to allow supplies across the 
border will be even more important if the MOU is not renewed or the sanctions modified 
to allow supplies to go into Kurdistan.
It may seem odd to argue that day-to-day dealings with the Iraqis should be reduced 
while contacts and assistance to the humanitarian agencies should be increased, but the 
reality is that such contacts are vital to the work of the MCC. The MCC needs the 
cooperation of the humanitarian agencies and the information that they can provide about 
the situation, especially in areas outside the old security zone.5 By offering support, 
material, and other assistance to the NGOs, the MCC brings something into the unwritten 
bargain. Without a humanitarian assistance component, NGOs will view the MCC as 
strictly an intelligence gathering operation and most humanitarian agencies will quickly 
distance themselves from it.
Some officers in Washington have suggested that the MCC should be withdrawn. 
To do so at this time would be a major mistake. The Kurds would regard it as the
5 The MCC is limited to travel within the old zone.
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beginning of the end of the allied commitment to protect them; it would be devastating to 
their morale and political position. The NGOs would see it as the end of the allied 
commitment to protect them and they would probably leave soon thereafter. The Turks 
would read it as giving them a free hand in Kurdistan and probably increase the bombing. 
Most important, it would send the wrong message to the Iraqis, who would interpret it as 
a sign that the allies were losing interest in the Kurds or unwilling to take risks on their 
behalf.
VI. PROSPECTS
UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
The current situation is full of ambiguities. There is no conflict but no peace. 
Kurdistan is not independent, yet it is not reintegrated into Iraq. The allies, and the U.S. 
in particular, would like to leave the area as soon as possible, yet fight hard to secure an 
extension of the agreement with Turkey which permits the protective overflights.
Each person’s view of the situation is shaped by what he or she would like to see as 
the final outcome. For those who want to disengage American forces from the region, the 
situation appears to be a tar pit from which it is difficult to escape. Advocates of 
disengagement are faced with the real possibility that the Iraqis would reenter the area and 
again send thousands of people streaming toward Turkey.
The proponents of international protection for the Kurds are satisfied, for now, with 
the current arrangements. As one supporter of the allied air operations pointed out, it is 
probably the cheapest peacekeeping operation anywhere. They argue that the allied 
overflights and the small MCC mission are well worth the price of holding the line until 
Saddam Hussein is forced out of office.
At the moment, all parties are playing for time. The allies hope that Saddam 
Hussein will be forced out of power -  but even if that happens it is not clear if it will be 
possible to leave the Kurds on their own. Saddam Hussein is hoping the allies will get tired 
of protecting the Kurds and quietly withdraw or that he can convince the Turks to withdraw 
their support of the allied operations. To that end, he has been sending envoys to Ankara 
encouraging the Turks to normalize relations with Iraq. One offer that he can make is to 
withdraw his clandestine support of the PKK -  an offer that some in Turkey are willing to 
explore.
The Kurds themselves are in the best position to benefit from the stalemate in which 
the allies, Turkey and Iraq find themselves. While the others have to sit and wait, they are 
using the situation to solidify their position, build relations with Europe, and reorient their 
economy inward. *
One factor in the equation is the American presidential election in November. While 
Turks have agreed to a six month extension of the OPC II agreement, some observers
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believe that the Turks only did it to help President Bush and that beyond November, the 
picture is subject to change. They feel that if President Bush is reelected, he may feel that 
he has more flexibility in withdrawing from the area. If Clinton is elected, the policy is also 
subject to change.6
The elections also introduce an element of uncertainty regarding Iraqi intentions. 
Some military analysts believe that Saddam Hussein might attempt to do something to the 
Kurds to embarrass President Bush just before the election.
The Kurds believe that a Bush win will be best for them. They believe, 
unrealistically, that Bush is committed to long-term support for their cause and they prefer 
to deal with the administration they know rather than one with which they have few 
contacts.
THE ALLIED APPROACH
Allied policymakers are in a dilemma. No one wants to risk withdrawing the allied 
protection at this time. Yet, as long as the situation remains as it is, Kurdistan continues 
to evolve into something more than an autonomous region and an implicit commitment to 
the Kurds grows.
In this situation, policymaking tends to be reactive, something that could be 
dangerous given the current situation. For example, in April the Iraqis began flying military 
aircraft in response to incursions by Iranian jets into Iraqi airspace. While the allied 
policymakers crafted a response, the Iraqis had established a precedent and by the time a 
decision was reached, it was felt that it was too difficult to tell them to ground the planes 
once again. Thus, because of circumstance, distance and time, the Iraqis were able to 
overcome a major restriction placed upon them by the allies.
MAJOR ISSUES FACING THE KURDS
The three principal issues for the Kurds are: how to solidify their political situation; 
how to improve their military situation; and how to rejuvenate and expand the economy.
Improving Their Political Situation
On the political question, the Kurdish Front appears to be holding together despite 
some recent rough going. On June 9, fighting erupted near Kirkuk between the KDP and
6 Source: Interviews with several Clinton foreign policy advisors.
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PUK. Several people were killed and the situation became tense across Kurdistan. Both 
sides took action to control the situation and after a day both parties lowered their guns.7
Despite their rivalry, Talabani and Barzani have forged an alliance, at least for the 
time being. Nonetheless, Kurdish politics are fractious and the different styles and political 
aims of the two leaders are often carried to extremes by their followers and other incidents 
are bound to occur.
The elections and the establishment of the Kurdish parliament have unified the 
Kurds as never before. The compromises that were worked out before and after the 
elections have satisfied virtually everyone and, far from being a divisive factor as elections 
are in many countries, the Kurdish elections have given the Kurds a sense of identity that 
is unprecedented. The success of the elections in this regard impressed virtually all Western 
observers. Instead of becoming an obstacle to political progress as elections have been in 
some countries, Kurdish elections appear to have made a number of activities more feasible. 
For example, in dealing with foreign countries, the parliament can speak for all the Kurds.
Resumption of negotiations with the Iraqis is probably now more difficult than 
before. The Iraqis preferred to deal with the two main parties because they could play one 
against the other. Now leaders have a clear mandate not to resume negotiations unless 
certain pre-conditions, such as the removal of Saddam Hussein, are met.
The elections appear to show a hardening of the line toward Iraq. Barzani, who 
campaigned on a platform of keeping the negotiations open, was expected to garner up to 
three quarters of the vote. But Talabani, who campaigned on a much tougher line on the 
negotiation issue, won a surprising 43 percent and ended up with an equal number of seats 
(50) in the assembly as Barzani. Even accounting for possible problems with the voting 
(several hundred thousand Kurds living in Kirkuk and more than a million in Baghdad, 
Mosul and other parts of Iraq obviously could not vote) the strong showing of Talabani 
indicates that the Kurdish populace is wary of dealing with the current Iraqi administration.
Some westerners had hoped that a strong win by Barzani would lead to a resumption 
of the talks between the Kurds and Baghdad. It is clear that Barzani could not do that now 
without wrecking the democratic structure that has served to legitimize the Kurdish 
movement.
The next stage for Kurdish democracy is to select a leader. Originally, this was to 
be accomplished by a runoff election within two months after the general election but since 
the vote was so close, both sides seem willing to let it slide for the time being. They believe 
that in the interim the assembly can act as an executive body itself authorizing individuals 
to act on its behalf on most matters.
7 The incident broke out when a former collaborator who has been accepted into the KDP was accused 
of spying by the PUK.
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It is probably wrong to conclude from the elections that Talabani is on the 
ascendancy and that his election gains represent a major shift in the Kurds’ long-term 
outlook. Kurdish politics are still largely a matter of clan loyalties, and on other issues 
Barzani is likely to regain political ground, mainly because his clan is larger and has more 
enduring affiliations with other Kurdish groups than Talabani. However, the strength of 
Talabani’s position on the singular issue of negotiations is impressive and is probably the 
prevalent position of the majority of the Kurds in the free areas.
* Improving their Security Situation
The Kurdish leadership sees two priorities on the security front; unifying the 
peshmerge and turning it into a credible force; and protecting the lowland cities. The new 
parliament has established a committee to examine ways to unify the peshmerge, if not under 
a single command, at least under the control of the parliament. Barzani and Talabani also 
are giving unification a high priority. In the near term, probably the best that can achieved 
is to find a way to coordinate the various forces, something that could be accomplished 
through a joint general staff. Other things that are feasible now are standardization of 
weaponry and organizational structures, improved communications between the two groups, 
and a sharing of intelligence. But turning the peshmerge into a stronger, credible force will 
require much more -  principally arms to counteract Iraqi aircraft and armor -  and it is not 
likely that they will get them from the allies.
The key to Iraqi Kurdistan’s military viability is the peshmerge's ability to deny their 
airspace to the Iraqis. This is crucial for three reasons:
1. Helicopter gunships can effectively contain the peshmerge's ability to wage small unit 
actions, and fear of the helicopter gunships’ attacks would quickly depopulate the 
countryside undermining peshmerge's support;
2. The civil population is vulnerable to chemical attack and even the mere presence of 
helicopters in the area would likely spark a mass evacuation of the civil population; 
and
3. Inability to control the airspace would permit the Iraqis to effectively seal off access 
to the mountains and prevent a renewed massive exodus toward Turkey. (Such an 
exodus would stimulate renewed Western intervention.)
Improving their Economy
At the moment, the economy of Kurdistan is highly dependent on agriculture. 
Kurdistan was virtually an economic colony of Iraq. It produced and exported agricultural 
products in return for manufactured goods produced or imported by the south. The few 
industries that did exist revolved around processing agricultural products. For example, one 
of the major industries was a cigarette factory that processed tobacco grown in the regions. 
If the Kurdish economy is to sustain itself, it will have to begin exporting something in order
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to earn foreign currency. Cigarettes are the most immediate prospect, though with time, 
other goods also could be manufactured and exported. The export of grain to countries 
other than Iraq is not feasible since Turkey is a major producer of grain and exports it to 
its neighbors. Iran does not appear to be a good candidate for grair though some 
vegetables and fruit, such as strawberries, could be exported if Iran was willing to buy.
To improve the economic situation, the Kurds are receiving foreign aid, especially 
technical assistance, to help identify items that could be manufactured and sold. But they 
also need the machinery and tools to process those commodities. So far, only a few NGOs 
fiave been willing to take up the matter and their assistance is generally limited to small- 
scale, community-based activities.
VIABILITY
Considering independence for Kurdistan would have been impossible if the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia were still intact. Since that time, 15 new republics have sprung up 
out of the ruins of the USSR and three, going on four, have come out of Yugoslavia, and 
more changes are eminent. This has lead some people to theorize that Kurdistan may be 
faced with a unique moment in history when aspirations for self-determination could be 
fulfilled and, possibly, an independent Kurdistan could evolve.
The current weakness of the economy leads naturally to the question of the viability 
of an independent Kurdistan. The answer to that question revolves around two additional 
questions: Does Kurdistan have the requisite resource base to establish an economy and 
can Turkey accept a Kurdish state on its borders?
The resource question is the easiest to address. There appears to be sufficient 
resources for the Kurds to build a viable economy. Many countries have survived and 
prospered on far less. The area grows enough grain and other agricultural commodities to 
feed itself and still have sufficient surplus to export to other areas. There are sufficient 
natural resources, especially minerals, that mining could become an income earner. The 
region has abundant water and could generate far more hydroelectric power than it needs.
A lingering question is petroleum. The main oil fields and refineries are located in 
and around Kirkuk. The city is still under Iraqi control and the object of bitter contention 
between the Iraqis and Kurdish authorities. The main pipeline to Turkey, now closed under 
the U.N. sanctions, originates in Kirkuk. The smaller oil fields of Ain Zaleh and Khanaquin 
(which is not functioning because of extensive damage inflicted during the Gulf War) are 
also in Kurdish areas under Iraqi control. It is clear that the Iraqis are not going to give 
the Kurds the oil producing areas. The area now controlled by the peshmerge has 
potentially rich fields under its control at Koy Sinjaq, but they cannot be developed as long 
as the U.N. sanctions continue to weigh on northern Iraq.
While a measure of assistance will be needed to stimulate northern Iraqi agriculture 
(seeds, insecticides, fertilizers, building material, some machinery and some infrastructure), 
heavier investment will be required to develop the industrial capacity of the region!
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especially in the oil sector. Beyond that, however, all Iraqi Kurdistan needs to survive is a 
guarantee of physical access to export markets. With that access Kurdistan could be an 
economically successful entity.
POLITICAL VIABILITY
The real question about Kurdistan’s viability is whether or not the Kurds’ neighbors, 
especially Turkey, would acquiesce to a Kurdish state. Iran is certainly opposed and would 
likely try to prevent it, though probably not by military means, at least for now -  with the 
breakup of the USSR, it has enough minority problems internally without igniting the 
Kurdish issue. Syria would not welcome an independent Kurdistan but the number of 
Kurds in Syria is relatively small and it is not certain that Syria would be able to do much 
about the issue directly. Other Arab countries have expressed opposition.
The principal neighbor of concern is, of course, Turkey. The Turkish position may 
not be as cut-and-dried as it was thought to be previously. There have been some surprising 
developments over the last year. Both President Ozal and Prime Minister Demirel have 
told senior foreign diplomats that they would never again allow the Kurds to be subjected 
to mass annihilation as they were in 1988 when Iraq used chemical weapons on Kurdish 
villages. Demirel, in particular, has repeatedly told foreigners that he would not permit 
another Halabja8." This has led to speculation by some Turkish specialists that civilians 
in the government are more flexible than the military on the question of an independent 
Kurdistan and that it might be possible to encourage the Turks to undertake the role of 
protector of the Kurds in northern Iraq.
What could be done to alleviate Turkish concerns and give the Kurds time to work 
out their own solution to the problem? It is clear that whatever happens, the situation will 
have to evolve slowly. If the Turks are confronted with a sudden change that crosses an 
unstated threshold toward independence, it is likely they would react. The cosmetics of a 
free Kurdish state of Northern Iraq" or "Northern Iraq" are essential to Kurdistan’s 
diplomatic viability.
For the time being, the Kurds can probably continue to handle the issue cosmetically, 
as they have done by flying the new Iraqi flag at the parliament building and by insisting 
that they are seeking to find a solution within the framework of a united Iraq. But beyond 
that, the Kurds need to engage in a series of confidence building measures to reduce the 
likelihood of Turkish obstruction, or worse, intervention. Some of these measures might 
include: 5
1* Further increase official contacts between the Kurds and Turkish military. Two 
recent moves have helped: the assignment of a Turkish officer to the MCC and the 
establishment of a Kurdish liaison office in Diyarbakir to coordinate with the Turkish 
military and government authorities bn matters pertaining to the PKK.
One of the principal Kurdish towns where the Iraqis used chemical warfare.
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2. Provide assistance to the Turks in controlling the PKK. Barzani and the KDP have 
already taken several minor steps to try and control the PKK in northern Iraq 
including military action against the PKK cadres. Talabani has been more 
circumspect (and is suspected by the Turks of having an alliance with the PKK).9 
If the Iraqi Kurds are to win the favor of the Turkish military, they will have to go 
far beyond liaison and small unit actions against the PKK.
3. Recall Kurdish refugees from Turkey. There are still 25,000 refugees remaining in 
Turkey from 1988 and 1991. A portion of these people will soon be resettled to 
other countries, but a residual population will remain. The refugee presence is a 
sore issue with Turkey and one measure that could be taken to build goodwill would
be for Barzani and Talabani to publicly and actively encourage the refugees to return 
to Kurdistan.
4. Help to undermine PKK support in southeastern Turkey. Several Turkish 
parliamentarians have said that the best way the Iraqi Kurds can win the support of 
the government is to undercut the popular support of the PKK in southeastern 
Turkey^ It is not clear how this could be done. Given the sympathies that many 
Ira<?!. . urds have for situation of their kinsmen in Turkey, most Kurdish 
politicians believe that the best, and most practical, thing that the Iraqi Kurdish 
leadership can do is to stay out of Turkey’s internal affairs (much the way that the 
Irish government has chosen to stay out of the situation in Northern Ireland).
5. Encourage the Turks to assume the role of Kurdistan’s protector. Some Kurds 
believe that a political accommodation can be reached with Turkey to give it a large 
role in the protection of Kurdistan. They argue that since Turkish influence is on 
the ascendancy m Azerbaijan and Central Asia, that Turkey could be encouraged to 
extend its influence so that Kurdistan would become a de facto protectorate of 
Turkey They argue that most Kurds would be willing to accept the Finlandization 
ot Kurdistan as a preferable alternative to reunification with Iraq.
It is vital that the Turks be involved as much as possible in OPC II as it gives the 
Turks firsthand experience with the Iraqi Kurds and increases the contact in a positive wav 
Recent moves to include Turks on the MCC are a good start.
The allies, especially the U.S., might also consider providing intelligence on PKK 
movements through the OPC structure. It is clear that the U.S. has the ability to increase 
the level of intelligence on PKK activities using assets that are available in the region. Bv 
using OPC as the channel, the Turks would have to give the operation more support.
’ Talaba" 'denieS a" alliancue' but believes that PKK can be controlled in northern Iraq by "non-violent 
means such as repopulating the border areas, though it is unclear how those measures could stop the PKK.
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TURKEY’S OPTIONS IN TRYING TO CONTROL IRAQI KURDISTAN
If Turkey were to decide that the Iraqi Kurds had gone too far, they would have 
several courses of action.
First, they could simply close the border (this is how they "send messages" to the 
Kurds now) and prevent the Kurds from receiving supplies. To be completely effective, this 
strategy would require the cooperation of Iran, but if the past is any guide, the Iranians 
would cooperate. There is a danger in this approach for the Turks. Such a move would
♦probably force the Iraqi Kurds into an alliance with the PKK and could actually work 
against Turkish interests. J
The second, and more drastic option, would be for the Turks to strike a bargain with 
*rac^s' . ^ rst ^ ur^s would abrogate the OPC II agreement, then seal the border. 
When Iraqi troops moved in, the Turks would not only stand by and do nothing they would 
prevent the allies from coming the Kurds’ aid. ’ J
In the present circumstances, such a scenario would be devastating to the Turks It 
would certainly affect their chances of joining the European Community and could result 
in a substantial curtailment of their role in NATO.
All other options that the Turks might consider are not practical. Aerial bombing 
would inflict damage but, without ground action, would have a negligible affect and would 
only harden the resolve of the Kurds. A coordinated military action by the Turks and Iraqis 
would be very costly to the Turks, not only in a public relations sense, but also in casualties 
and again, could incite an uprising in southeastern Turkey. If the Iranians were involved 
the public relations consequences for Turkey would be enormous.
Thus, while Turkey does have some options, they are not particularly good and any 
decision to use these would have to be considered carefully against Turkey’s more important 
long-range interests. r
PROSPECTS FOR ENDING ALLIED PROTECTION
As much as allied policymakers would like to quit Kurdistan, realistically, there are 
only a few scenarios under which it could be done without risking subsequent reoccupation 
by the Iraqis. They are: r
1. A change of administration in Baghdad. Unfortunately, this is the least likely in the 
immediate future. While there is some hope that an anti-Saddam alliance may yet 
emerge, it does not seem all that likely in the near-term.10 Furthermore, a change 
of administration will not necessarily help the Kurds. In another Iraqi military man 
were to replace Saddam Hussein, he would likely to continue to advocate reclaiming
10 Recently, a coalition of anti-Saddam groups met in Vienna.
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the Kurdish areas. Tire situation is only likely to change if a democratic civilian 
government was to come to power. n
2. Conclusion of an agreement with Baghdad. While it is not completely out of the 
question, it is highly unlikely that the Kurds will reenter negotiations with Saddam 
Hussein, unless there is a major change in the situation. The allies might use the 
resumption of talks as a pretext for withdrawing but, at this stage, doing so would 
undermine the Kurds and eliminate their main bargaining chip. While such a move 
was possible a year ago, today it is not.
$
3. Providing the peshmerge with the means to defend themselves. Several congressmen
aX? su88este the best way for the allies to withdraw is to give the Kurds
sufficient arms to protect themselves against the Iraqis. The peshmerge themselves 
are confident that they could hold out against Iraqi if they could defend themselves 
against low-flying aircraft, especially helicopters that carry chemical weapons In
TOWS! ’ W0UM KkC ‘,° h3Ve m° re S°Phlstlcated anti-tank w e a p o n s ^  as TOWS). ’Hie main obstacle to providing these weapons, of course, is the Turks.
• ‘T f  ? ISSTCS; SUCh as the Stlnger’ could not only be used against Iraqi 
aircraft, but also Turkish planes. Even if the Kurds did have these weapons they
would not likely be able to hold on to the cities in the face of an Iraqi assault, but
oenTtrat- “ “ f ,T  d° Ubt ‘hat th° Se weaPons would make an attempted Iraqi penetration of the mountains extremely difficult. F "
Other possibilities have been discussed including the replacement of the allied
E h T t h r ^ f 3 tN tT hta,Z miSSi° n; the P°ssibili*y of a Kurdish alliance with Turkey; Ind 
the threat of a total embargo on Iraq. All of these options might be feasible if
circumstances change dramatically, but again, none appears workable in the near future
to \h e  nertUs“ lke y ° f preconditions for endmg the allied presence will be metin the next six months and quite possibly much longer.
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